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Financial Incentives to 
Work: Comparing Ireland 
and the UK 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the financial 
incentive to work in Ireland and the UK. It uses closely harmonised tax 
and benefit microsimulation models for both countries, based on 
household survey data, to provide an accurate and representative picture 
of the financial incentive to be in employment and to progress facing key 
groups in both countries.  
 
The incentive to be in employment is measured by the replacement rate 
(the ratio of out-of-work to in-work income) and participation tax rate, 
the proportion of earnings that are taken away in tax or lower benefit 
entitlements when an individual takes up a job. On average, replacement 
rates are quite similar in the two countries, although there is greater 
dispersion in the UK, with a larger share of both the employed and out-
of-work population facing replacement rates above 70 per cent. By 
contrast, average participation tax rates are somewhat higher in Ireland, 
particularly for those currently in work and unemployed jobseekers. 
Importantly, the incidence of the highest participation tax rates (those 
greater than 70 per cent, which can be the most distortive to labour 
market decisions) is somewhat higher in the UK. 
 
There is cross-country variation in these incentives for different family 
types. On average, potential first earners in couples with children face 
weaker incentives to be in full-time work in the UK than in Ireland, while 
the opposite is true for potential first earners in couples without children. 
This is in part due to differences in the design of each country’s benefit 
system: the UK provides more generous out-of-work benefits to couples 
with children than does Ireland, while the opposite is true for out-of-
work couples without children.  
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The paper also examines the incentive to progress (i.e. earn more 
whether through increased hours, effort or skill), as measured by the 
marginal effective tax rate (this includes benefit withdrawal as well as 
explicit taxes on income and social insurance contributions). While more 
than two-fifths of workers in Ireland face a marginal effective tax rate 
greater than 50 per cent compared to less than a fifth in the UK (because 
the threshold at which the higher rate of income tax begins to apply is 
much lower in Ireland), much fewer face marginal effective tax rates in 
excess of 70 per cent, created by the withdrawal of multiple means-
tested benefits in the UK.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The role of the tax and welfare systems in shaping financial incentives to 
work has been extensively analysed and debated in Ireland and in many 
other countries. At an international level, the OECD has maintained a 
focus on policies which ‘make work pay’ – or more precisely, make work 
pay more. This has also been a recurring theme in national debate both in 
Ireland and in the UK. In Irish debate, comparisons are sometimes drawn 
with the UK based on headline numbers such as the basic rates of welfare 
payment and income tax rates. Such simple comparisons ignore key 
differences between the tax and welfare systems in the two jurisdictions 
and the important effect on incentives that interactions between 
components of these systems can have. 
 
This paper provides a more comprehensive view of the financial 
incentives to work which are shaped by the Irish and UK tax and benefit 
systems. For the first time,1 we use closely harmonised tax-benefit 
models for Ireland and the UK to document the incentives actually faced 
by nationally representative samples. Accurately documenting the actual 
incentives faced by diverse households in both countries is a challenging 
task, and is the primary goal of this paper. The paper also provides some 
initial evidence on what generates the different incentives; future work 
could further investigate the role played by different factors, including 
the distribution of wages, particular features of the tax and transfer 
system, and the composition of the two populations. The choices made 
by policymakers regarding the structure of taxes and transfers will, of 
 
                                                          
1  Broad comparisons based on available microsimulation results were made in Callan et al. (2012; 2013); the 
new results presented here provide much greater detail, and are based on a closer harmonisation of 
modelling assumptions and concepts. 
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course, reflect national differences in trade-offs between equity and 
efficiency, economic and budgetary conditions, historical factors, and 
perhaps the (perceived) extent to which the behaviour of people in 
different countries responds to financial incentives. While analysis of 
these policy decisions is outside the scope of the current paper, 
documenting the incentives accurately for the two countries is an 
important building block and provides useful context in which policy 
debate and policy choices can be conducted. 
 
The work undertaken here is made possible by our use of tax and benefit 
microsimulation models for both countries.2 These models – respectively 
SWITCH at the ESRI and TAXBEN at the Institute for Fiscal Studies – allow 
us to calculate the financial work incentives faced by any individual or 
family in a particular dataset, taking account of their precise 
circumstances and how they are treated by the tax and benefit system as 
a whole. For both Ireland and the UK our results are based on the 
analysis of data for representative samples of the respective populations 
and tax-benefit systems in place in April 2015. Our use of representative 
samples of the populations avoids the pitfalls which would arise from the 
use of a limited number of ‘example families’ to describe the effect of the 
tax and benefit system on work incentives. While example families are 
useful in understanding some of the mechanisms at work, they cannot 
take account of the wide variety of circumstances relevant to tax and 
welfare which affect real families e.g., differences in earning capacity, 
household composition, and housing tenure: all factors that determine 
entitlements to benefits and liabilities to taxation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the 
structure of the personal tax and benefit systems in each of Ireland and 
the UK. Section 3 outlines how financial work incentives are measured 
and details the data that we use. As discussed in Savage et al. (2014), a 
number of factors, such as dynamic gains over the longer term in 
employment, and non-financial rewards from working, affect 
participation in employment. The results in this analysis are based on 
static measures of the financial incentive to work, and should therefore 
be interpreted in this context. Section 4 presents results for the UK and 
Ireland on the incentive to be in paid employment. In measuring this 
 
                                                          
2  For further information on how the models are constructed and used to analyse work incentives see, for 
Ireland, Callan et al. (2012 and 2013), Savage et al. (2014 and 2015) and for the UK (Adam and Browne, 
2010; 2013; Adam et al., 2015).  
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incentive we focus on three key groups, which have also been examined 
in earlier papers to the Budget Perspectives conference:  
• those who are currently unemployed (for whom we measure the 
financial incentive to take up employment)  
• those who are currently classified as ‘economically inactive’ or in 
‘home duties’, and 
• those who are currently employed (for whom we measure the 
incentive to remain in employment).  
 
Section 5 presents results, for those who are currently employed, on 
incentives to work more hours or to earn increased wages (‘the incentive 
to progress’). In measuring these incentives we take account not just of 
tax rates and social insurance contributions, but also the withdrawal of 
benefits from the individual concerned and/or his or her spouse or 
partner.  
 
2 HOW TAXES AND BENEFITS SHAPE FINANCIAL WORK INCENTIVES  
Financial work incentives for a given individual can be described by the 
net income attainable at various hours of work. They therefore depend 
on both the gross wage rate an individual can command and the taxes 
and benefits payable by/to them at different levels of earnings.3 To 
understand fully the financial work incentives facing any given individual, 
we can look at their ‘budget constraint’; that is the relationship between 
disposable after tax and benefit income and hours of work at a given 
hourly wage.4 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship in both the UK and Ireland for a 
hypothetical single adult earning the (country-specific) median hourly 
wage if in employment, and the relevant welfare benefits if not in 
 
                                                          
3  While typically income taxes will depend on income, and not on hours of work, some welfare benefits are 
affected both by the level of earnings and the hours of work (e.g., working at least a certain minimum 
number of hours to qualify for Family Income Supplement). 
4  To compare budget constraints in the two countries, we need to convert UK quantities from Pounds 
Sterling to Euro. We do this using an exchange rate which is corrected for purchasing power (Purchasing 
Power Parity, from OECD, 2016). This results, for 2015, in a conversion of €1 equal to approximately £0.825 
Sterling. The PPP exchange rate has varied between 82 pence Sterling and 84.5 pence Sterling over the 
years 2010 to 2015 – variations within this range would have little impact on the broad comparisons 
highlighted here. 
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employment.5 Assuming that they live in private rented accommodation 
and receive support for housing costs, the solid lines show that this 
example individual would have a similar level of disposable income out-
of-work in the UK and Ireland: €266 and €278 per week respectively. 
They would see little financial gain to working fewer than ten hours a 
week in the UK. In Ireland, on the other hand, net income rises steadily 
with hours worked over this range. The segment of the budget constraint 
from ten to 16 hours per week is quite flat in both countries: individuals 
in both countries keep between 10-15 per cent of gross earnings from 
working an additional hour over this range. At higher hour levels, the 
example individual keeps a much larger share of any increase in gross 
earnings in both countries, resulting in a steeper budget constraint and 
stronger work incentives.  
 
Support for housing costs is a key factor in determining the shape of the 
budget constraint in both countries. However, not all individuals are 
eligible for such support: for example, in Ireland, less than 10 per cent of 
those receiving Jobseeker payments (Benefit or Allowance) also received 
Rent Supplement. The dashed lines in Figure 1 show the budget 
constraint for an example single adult earning the median wage who 
does not receive support for housing costs.6 The level of out-of-work 
income for this example individual is a lot lower in the UK than Ireland, at 
around €90 per week compared to €188. There is again a segment (from 
one to seven hours) where this individual would see little financial gain to 
working in the UK, but at hour levels above this, net income rises steadily 
with earnings. In Ireland, there are gains from entering employment even 
at low hours, while retaining a partial Jobseeker’s Allowance payment. 
The withdrawal of that payment (assuming that 24 hours equates to a 
three-day week) leads to a small range of hours (21-24) over which the 
budget constraint is flat or declines slightly, before resuming an upward 
slope.  
 
 
                                                          
5  Although the median wage in Ireland is higher than in the UK, the patterns described here are not sensitive 
to this.  
6  For example, an adult child living in the parental home, or someone owning their home outright. 
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FIGURE 1  Example Budget Constraint for a Single Adult at the Irish and UK Median 
Wages, April 2015 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN for the UK and SWITCH for Ireland. 
Notes:  Examples shown are for single adult with no children, earning the median wage in Ireland (€15.53 per hour) or the 
UK (€14.25 per hour), with no other private income, no childcare costs, and no disabled family members. The solid 
lines assume the individual pays the median rent and average band D council tax in London or the live-in private 
accommodation paying rent equal to the maximum rent limit for a single adult under Rent Supplement rules in 
Dublin. 
 
What features of each country’s tax and benefit systems lead to these 
patterns? In Ireland, the shape of the budget constraints shown here is 
strongly influenced by the fact that jobseekers can combine a part-time 
job, working up to three days per week, with a partial Jobseeker’s 
Allowance payment (JA), which is subject to a means-test. Any remaining 
JA payment is completely withdrawn from those working more than 
three days per week, resulting in the drop in net income at 24 hours per 
week in Figure 1. A second key feature is the structure of Rent 
Supplement payment, which is means-tested, and is not available when 
working more than 30 hours per week. The new Housing Assistance 
Payment (HAP) currently being rolled out has a different structure, which 
does not exclude full-time workers from potentially receiving support: 
analysis of this scheme is currently being undertaken by ESRI researchers.  
 
Incomes are also subject to income tax at standard and higher rates of 20 
per cent and 40 per cent, and to the Universal Social Charge (USC) at 
rates of 1.5 per cent, 3.5 per cent, 7 per cent and 8 per cent on successive 
tranches of income. Employee and employer pay-related social insurance 
(PRSI) contributions are usually 4 per cent and 10.75 per cent. 
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In the UK, the budget constraint is completely flat at low levels of hours 
worked because means-tested out-of-work benefits, which provide a 
minimum income, are reduced pound-for-pound as private income rises 
until that minimum level is reached.7 After these have been fully 
withdrawn (at seven hours per week in Figure 1), the UK budget 
constraint can remain flat due to the simultaneous withdrawal of housing 
benefit (which provides support towards rental costs) and council tax 
support (which gives low-income families assistance with their local tax 
liabilities).8 The jump in net income at 30 hours per week is a result of 
entitlement to working tax credit (WTC), which provides support for 
those with low incomes who also fulfil a minimum hours rule, and is 
withdrawn from those with incomes above a certain level. Low-income 
households with children may also be entitled to child tax credit (CTC), 
subject to the same means test as WTC, meaning entitlements (and the 
benefit taper) can extend quite far up the income distribution.9 A 
consequence of this piecemeal system of support is that families in 
receipt of multiple benefits can face extremely high withdrawal rates.  
 
As well as facing the withdrawal of benefits, those with sufficiently high 
incomes are subject to income tax and National Insurance Contributions 
(NICs). Each individual has a personal allowance (£10,600 for most 
taxpayers in 2015-2016), which is deducted from total income before tax 
to give taxable income, on which income tax is levied at a basic (20 per 
cent), higher (40 per cent) and additional (45 per cent) rate. NICs are paid 
on earnings above a floor at a rate of 13.8 per cent by employers, and 
rates of 12 per cent (up to a ceiling) and 2 per cent (above this ceiling) by 
employees under the state pension age. Reduced rates of NICs are paid 
some individuals including the self-employed and by employers on the 
earnings of employees under the age of 21.10 
 
Examining budget constraints created by the tax and benefit system for 
particular families can be informative and point to potential disincentives 
 
                                                          
7  These means-tested benefits include income support (IS), income-based jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) or 
employment and support allowance (ESA), which top up claimants’ income to a minimum level. Note that 
the UK government are currently in the process of replacing many of the benefits described here into a 
single programme, to be known as Universal Credit. See Appendix 3 for more details. 
8  Council tax support is localised in England, with each council responsible for the design of their own 
scheme. In Figure 1, the example individual is assumed to live in an area which did not make any changes 
from the national council tax benefit in operation before April 2013 (e.g. Westminster).  
9  For a more detailed description of the UK benefit system see Hood and Oakley (2014). 
10  For a more detailed description of the UK tax system, see Pope et al. (2015). 
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to work the system creates. But families’ circumstances vary widely and 
there is a limit to what examination of illustrative budget constraints can 
tell us about the patterns of work incentives faced by the population as a 
whole. For example, while Figure 1 examined budget constraints for 
single adults at the median wage in both countries, the budget constraint 
for a particular individual will depend on whether the individual is 
entitled to housing support payments (as shown in the Figure), whether 
they have a partner and/or dependent children, their own and their 
partner’s wage, and many other individual and household characteristics. 
To make such analysis tractable, our focus is on summary measures of 
financial work incentives that are obtained using tax and benefit micro-
simulation models. The next section describes this approach. 
 
3 MEASURING FINANCIAL WORK INCENTIVES 
In this section, we define summary measures of financial work incentives 
used in this paper. We distinguish between the incentive an individual 
faces to be in paid work or not and the incentive for someone in work to 
increase their earnings slightly – whether by working more hours, seeking 
promotion,11 or moving to a better-paid job. In Section 3.1 we consider 
the incentive an individual faces to be in paid work (as opposed to not 
being in paid work). Section 3.2 then looks at measuring the incentive for 
someone in work to increase their earnings slightly. 
 
These measures are all calculated for the tax and benefit systems in place 
in April 2015 using the microsimulation models developed by the ESRI 
(SWITCH) and the IFS (TAXBEN), run on data from the 2010 Survey of 
Living Conditions (SILC) and 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey (FRS) for 
Ireland and the UK respectively. These data are provided by the Irish 
Central Statistics Office and the UK Office for National Statistics, and are 
uprated so as to be representative of the 2015 population and incomes in 
both countries.  
 
3.1  The Incentive to be in Paid Work12 
There are two main approaches to the measurement of the incentive to 
be in paid work. The replacement rate (RR) gives an individual’s out-of-
work income as a percentage of their in work income. This is the measure 
 
                                                          
11  For example, by investing in training. 
12  This section draws heavily on Adam and Browne (2010). 
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that has been most commonly used in analysis of the incentive to be in 
paid work in Ireland, and is defined as: 
 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑤
𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑤  
 
For example, an individual whose net income out-of-work was €200, and 
whose net income in employment was €300 would have a replacement 
rate of just under 67 per cent. 
 
The Participation Tax Rate (PTR) gives the proportion of earnings that are 
taken away in tax or lower benefit entitlements when an individual starts 
work. Therefore, 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑅 = �1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑤 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑤
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑔 + 𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑤 𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑔� 
 
Employer social security contributions do not play a role in the 
replacement rate calculation, which relates to the net income faced by 
the individual in and out-of-work. But employer social insurance 
contributions are relevant when considering how much of the total 
labour cost paid by an employer is taken in overall taxation, via employer 
and employee social insurance contributions and income taxes. Consider 
again, the example of an individual with in-work income of €300 and out-
of-work income of €200. If, for example, at these earnings, employer 
social security contributions amounted to €50 then the total ‘employer 
cost’ would be €350 per week and the participation tax rate would be 71 
per cent.  
 
For both of these measures: 
• Net income means income after benefits have been added and taxes 
and social security contributions are deducted. For individuals in 
couples, it is possible to calculate these incentive measures based on 
family income or on individual income. Previous Irish work and most 
UK work has focused on family income and we follow the same 
approach here.13 In all cases, partners’ behaviour is assumed to be 
 
                                                          
13  Whether family or individual income is more appropriate depends on which is more important for the 
individual’s decisions. For example, a low-earning person living with a high-earning partner may have no 
10 
held constant when calculating an individuals’ financial work 
incentive.  
• Low numbers indicate that the financial incentive to work is strong 
and vice versa.14 
 
Both these measures attempt to capture the incentive to work or not, 
but they are conceptually different, In order to understand this better, 
consider an equal cash gain in each of in-work and out-of-work incomes. 
This should reduce the attractiveness of working compared to not 
working. On the other hand an increase in the hourly wage should 
increase the financial incentive to work. The replacement rate measure 
conforms to these expectations; but the PTR has different implications: 
• An increase in income of a constant Euro amount at all hours 
(including zero) does not change the PTR, but increases the RR. This 
means that the PTR would suggest no change in incentives, but the RR 
would suggest that they have got weaker.  
• At a given level of hours of work, an increase in the gross hourly wage 
will strengthen work incentives according to the RR, but will have 
ambiguous effects according to the PTR.  
 
The PTR does, however, have one significant advantage over the RR 
measure: the PTR is driven largely by how the tax and benefit system 
(rather than potential wages) affects the incentive to work. While the RR 
conflates the incentives caused by taxes and earnings power, the PTR 
distinguishes, to a greater extent, between whether a reduced reward to 
work is caused by higher taxes or lower wages.15 
 
                                                          
independent income if he or she does not work, and therefore would have a very low RR – a strong financial 
incentive to work – when calculated using individual income. However, the same individual would have a 
very high RR when calculated using family income, because whether he or she works makes little difference 
proportionally to the family’s income. By contrast, the PTR for this individual is likely to be very low (if the 
individual is only paying income tax and employee social security contributions on a small portion of their 
earnings, and is in a family which has an income too great to be entitled to tax credits) regardless of 
whether individual or family income is used for the calculation.  
14  A PTR of 0% would indicate that an individual did not have to pay any tax on their earnings and did not lose 
any benefit entitlement when they started work, whereas a RR of 0% would indicate that an individual 
would not receive any income if they did not work. A PTR or RR of 100% would indicate that all of an 
individual’s earnings would be taken from them in tax or lower benefit entitlements if they worked, so they 
would be no better off working than not working. 
15  Comparing PTRs between Ireland and the UK is not a comparison of the pure impact of the tax and benefit 
systems on the incentive to work in the two countries. This is because the increase in gross earnings, as well 
as the presence of any partners’ earnings, that the PTR is calculated from will differ between the two 
countries. The comparison of PTRs therefore shows how the tax and benefit system in each country affects 
the financial incentive to work at the wages that individuals receive, or can expect to receive, in 
employment. 
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Broadly speaking, therefore, the RR measures the absolute strength of 
financial incentives to work whereas the PTR measures the effect of the 
tax and benefit system on work incentives. Both are of interest, and 
because of this difference in what the two measures are describing, much 
of the empirical analysis that follows will use both measures.  
 
For non-workers, an estimate is required of how much they would earn if 
they did work. The approach taken here is to estimate the hourly wage 
which an individual could command, based on characteristics such as age 
and educational qualifications. We then examine how much they would 
earn at 20 hours per week and at 40 hours per week, as an indicator of 
their potential earnings in part-time and full-time work. More detail on 
the approach can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
3.2  The Incentive to Progress 
The incentive for those in work to increase their earnings can be 
measured by the marginal effective tax rate (METR). The METR measures 
what proportion of a small change in employer cost (the sum of 
employee earnings and employer social insurance contributions) is lost to 
tax payments and forgone state benefit entitlements, and it tells us about 
the strength of the incentive for individuals to increase their earnings 
slightly, whether through working more hours, or through promotion, 
qualifying for bonus payments or getting a better-paid job. In this paper, 
we use the term ‘incentive to earn more’ to describe this set of 
possibilities.  
 
As with the incentive to work at all, low numbers mean stronger financial 
incentives. A METR of zero means that the individual keeps all of any 
small change in what their employer pays, and a rate of 100 per cent 
means that the individual keeps none. High METRs amongst workers in 
low-income families are often referred to as the poverty trap. 
 
4 THE INCENTIVE TO BE IN PAID WORK 
In this section, we compare the financial incentive to be in paid work in 
Ireland and the UK. First we compare the financial incentive to work for 
individuals who are currently out of work in Ireland and the UK. We then 
discuss the incentives of individuals who are currently in work in the two 
countries.  
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4.1  Out-of-Work Individuals 
The financial incentive to work faced by individuals currently out of work 
is often a key concern for policymakers. In this section, we examine the 
financial incentive to work for two distinct groups of out-of-work 
individuals: unemployed jobseekers and individuals whose labour force 
status is defined as ‘economically inactive’ by the ONS in the UK and as 
‘engaged in home duties’ by the CSO in Ireland. Unemployed jobseekers 
make up approximately one-third of the out-of-work group in both 
countries and are predominantly single. A majority of the economically 
inactive/home duties group have a working partner.16 
 
We begin by considering the distribution of replacement rates for the 
out-of-work groups at 20 and 40 hours per week. The columns in Figure 2 
show median replacement rates (RRs), and are overlaid with capped bars 
showing the 25th and 75th percentile of RRs for these groups in both 
countries. The Figure shows that median replacement rates for the 
unemployed and others out of work are very similar in Ireland and the 
UK, though slightly higher in the UK at 20 hours of work a week. The 
capped bars also show that there is a wider dispersion of replacement 
rates at 40 hours in the UK than in Ireland, with more people facing RRs 
of either below 40 per cent or above 70 per cent. 
 
 
                                                          
16  A full description of the family type composition of these groups, as well as the employees, can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
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FIGURE 2  Distribution of Replacement Rates for Out-of-Work Individuals in the UK and 
Ireland 
 
Notes:  Columns show the median replacement rate for each of the groups on the horizontal axis, while the capped bars 
show the 25th and 75th percentiles; the values for which 25 percent of the group have a replacement rate below or 
above respectively.  
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, calibrated to represent the 2015 
population, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and 
those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
Policymakers are often concerned that high replacement rates might 
discourage those who are out of work from taking up a job. Table 1 
shows the proportion of the two out-of-work groups facing replacement 
rates above 70 per cent at 20 and 40 hours per week, given their 
estimated hourly wage. In both countries, very few individuals are 
financially better off out of work than they would be in part- or full-time 
work; that is, very few have a replacement rate in excess of 100 per cent. 
The majority of both groups would see a significant increase in their 
disposable income by taking up full-time employment, particularly in 
Ireland. More than eight out of ten unemployed jobseekers in Ireland and 
about three out of four of those in the UK have a replacement rate of less 
than 70 per cent – that is they would increase their income by at least 43 
per cent by taking up full-time employment. 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Unemployed, 20hrs Unemployed, 40hrs Other out-of-work,
20hrs
Other out-of-work,
40hrs
Ireland UK
14 
TABLE 1  Estimated Replacement Rates in Ireland and the UK  
RR Category Ireland UK Ireland UK 
 Unemployed jobseekers 20 hours 40 hours 
 
% of group with RR above cut-off value 
>70 37.5 46.1 18.0 25.2 
>80 18.2 32.5 6.3 11.9 
>90 5.4 12.5 1.5 0.9 
>100 1.3 2.0 0.7 0.3 
Other out-of-work 20 hours 40 hours 
>70 58.2 64.1 33.4 38.3 
>80 37.1 40.7 9.9 16.1 
>90 10.8 14.0 2.4 2.8 
>100 1.6 2.3 0.7 0.4 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
Replacement rates facing those considering a part-time job at 20 hours 
per week offer weaker incentives to work in both countries. The financial 
incentive to work is weakest in both countries for those who are 
economically inactive in the UK or engaged in ‘home duties’ in Ireland: 64 
per cent of these in the UK have a replacement rate in excess of 70 per 
cent, compared to 58 per cent in Ireland. For unemployed jobseekers, the 
proportions facing replacement rates in excess of 70 per cent at 20 hours 
work per week are 46.1 per cent in the UK compared to 37.5 per cent in 
Ireland. 
 
It is clear is that for both groups, the proportion facing RRs in excess of 70 
per cent is higher in the UK than Ireland. As discussed in Section 3, the 
financial gain from working depends on both the gross wage an individual 
can expect to earn upon taking up employment, and the design of the tax 
and benefit system in determining in-work and out-of-work income. 
Gross wages are compared in Figure 3 which shows the distribution of 
hourly wages of employees in the UK and Ireland, again using an 
exchange rate adjusted for purchasing power (OECD, 2016), and shows 
that a greater proportion of employees in the UK are employed at or 
below €10 per hour.  
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FIGURE 3  Distribution of Hourly Earnings in Ireland and UK, 2015 
 
 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-
2014 Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
Using the approach described in Appendix 1, wages that out-of-work 
individuals could expect to earn upon entering employment are 
estimated using the observed relationship between employee wages and 
the characteristics of those employees. Table 2 compares the estimated 
wages for unemployed jobseekers or those on ‘home duties’ in Ireland 
with those in the UK, along with the actual wages of employees. As with 
the observed wages of employees, estimated wages in the UK are lower 
than those in Ireland. In particular, individuals in the UK – whether 
current employees, unemployed jobseekers, or economically inactive – 
are more likely than their Irish counterparts to face wages below €10 per 
hour. Other things being equal, individuals in each labour force status 
examined here are therefore more likely to earn a higher wage in Ireland 
compared with the UK, and as a result, are more likely to have a higher 
in-work income and so a lower replacement rate.17 
 
 
                                                          
17  Differences in work incentives arise for many other reasons (e.g., tax and benefit differences). We highlight 
the role of wages here because it is sometimes neglected in discourse on this subject, and the comparison 
of the wage distributions shows that it can be significant.  
16 
TABLE 2  Actual and Estimated Wages in Ireland and the UK – Percentage in Each 
Category 
Wages Employees 
Unemployed 
Jobseekers Other out-of-work 
(€ per hour) (actual wages) (predicted wages) (estimated wages) 
 Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK 
<€10 15 30 26 45 27 38 
€10-€12.50 17 16 14 16 17 14 
€12.50-€15 16 12 12 10 11 13 
€15-€20 21 16 21 15 19 15 
€20+ 31 26 27 15 26 20 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, calibrated to represent the 2015 
population, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and 
those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
There is one important caveat to the comparison of these groups 
between countries. The UK unemployment rate is currently about half 
the Irish unemployment rate. The composition of the two groups (in 
particular their earnings ability) will likely differ markedly. Differences in 
work incentives between the groups in both countries will differ not just 
because of differences in the tax and benefit systems, but also because in 
comparing the groups in both countries we will be comparing two quite 
different groups. This factor contributes to the differences in estimated 
wages observed in Table 2. 
 
While the replacement rate captures the absolute strength of the 
financial incentive to take up employment, the participation tax rate 
(PTR) comes closer to measuring how the tax and benefit system 
specifically affects the incentive to work. Figure 4 shows the median, 
25th and 75th percentile of PTRs for both groups of out-of-work 
individuals in the UK and Ireland. At both 20 and 40 hours, median PTRs 
are lower for unemployed jobseekers in the UK than Ireland. PTRs are 
also more dispersed for this group in the UK, with more facing PTRs both 
above 70 per cent and below 40 per cent than in Ireland. For the other 
out-of-work individuals (those engaged in home duties in Ireland and 
economically inactive in the UK), median PTRs are lower in Ireland at 20 
hours but slighter higher at 40 hours.  
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FIGURE 4  Distribution of Participation Tax Rates for Out-of-Work Individuals in the UK 
and Ireland 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, calibrated to represent the 2015 
population, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and 
those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
Notes:  Columns show the median participation tax rate for each of the groups on the horizontal axis, while the capped bars 
show the 25th and 75th percentiles; the values for which 25 percent of the group have a participation tax rate below 
or above respectively. 
 
Again, policymakers may be especially concerned about the effects of 
high PTRs on the incentives out-of-work individuals face to take up 
employment. Table 4 shows the proportion of the two groups facing PTRs 
above 60 per cent at 20 and 40 hours per week, given their estimated 
hourly wage.18 Although PTRs are on average higher in Ireland, PTRs in 
excess of 70 per cent are somewhat more common in the UK than in 
Ireland, especially at 20 hours per week for unemployed jobseekers. 
 
                                                          
18  In focusing on those with a ‘high’ participation tax rate, we choose a lower threshold (60 per cent) than in 
our discussion of those with a ‘high’ replacement rate. A comparison of Figures 2 and 4 shows that these 
quantities have different scales – in particular PTRs tend to be lower than replacement rate. 
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TABLE 3  Estimated Participation Tax Rates in Ireland and the UK 
PTR Category Ireland UK Ireland UK 
 Unemployed jobseekers 20 hours 40 hours 
 % of cases above cut-off value 
>60 38.8 32.3 32.2 30.6 
>70 17.4 26.5 14.8 17.2 
>80 4.8 17.7 4.4 3.9 
>90 2.9 4.4 1.3 0.5 
>100 1.5 2.0 0.7 0.3 
Other out-of-work 20 hours 40 hours 
>60 21.4 23.3 22.7 26.3 
>70 14.0 17.0 10.7 14.3 
>80 7.1 9.8 4.3 5.3 
>90 3.0 3.6 2.1 0.6 
>100 1.6 2.3 0.7 0.4 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
Household composition plays a significant role in explaining the pattern 
of estimated replacement and participation tax rates for these groups. 
For example, more than half of unemployed jobseekers in both countries 
are single, whereas the majority of those engaged in home duties in 
Ireland or economically inactive in the UK have a partner in work. The 
family income of these groups is therefore likely to be higher than for 
unemployed jobseekers, leaving many of them facing a high replacement 
rate, especially at 20 hours per week. 
 
Table 4 shows how average estimated replacement rates and 
participation tax rates vary by family types in both countries (at 40 hours 
of work per week). In both countries, single adults face the lowest RRs 
and PTRs on average, reflecting the fact that they tend to have low out-
of-work family income: both because they do not have partners and – as 
the majority are childless – many have lower levels of benefit income to 
lose on moving into full-time work.19 Potential first earners in couples, 
especially those with children, face the highest average RRs and PTRs for 
the opposite reason: they tend to be entitled to higher benefit income 
out of work and face the withdrawal of this on moving into full-time 
work.  
 
                                                          
19  This family grouping includes both lone parents and single adults without children, who face very different 
treatment by the tax and benefit system. Work is ongoing at the ESRI to raise the effective sample size and 
so allow for separate examination of lone parents. 
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There are also some interesting cross-country differences by family type. 
Potential first earners in couples with children face weaker incentives to 
be in full-time work in the UK than in Ireland: for example, average 
replacement rates are 8 percentage points higher in the UK for 
unemployed jobseekers of this family type (73 per cent compared to 65 
per cent). This reflects the fact that such families tend to be entitled to 
Child Tax Credit (CTC) when out of work – a tax credit which is withdrawn 
against earnings at a rate of 41 per cent on top of income tax and NICs, 
resulting in some high RRs and PTRs.  
 
TABLE 4  Average Predicted Replacement and Participation Tax Rates at 40 hours, by 
Family Type 
  Replacement Rates Participation Tax Rates 
  Ireland UK Ireland UK 
Unemployed Jobseekers 
Single 34.6 35.5 49.4 46.8 
Couple, partner not working 63.8 68.2 65.8 65.6 
 No children 59.2 53.8 68.1 58.4 
 Children 65.2 73.4 65.1 68.3 
Couple, partner working 57.9 61.0 54.2 41.2 
 No children 51.3 53.3 45.1 31.2 
 Children 60.8 67.1 58.2 49.2 
All 47.7 46.7 55.1 48.8 
Other Out of Work 
Single 47.9 43.7 53.2 48.1 
Couple, partner not working 63.2 64.1 57.3 56.2 
 No children 59.5 58.3 60.0 48.8 
 Children 65.8 69.9 55.4 63.8 
Couple, partner working 65.0 64.8 42.2 40.0 
 No children 64.0 56.1 40.2 31.7 
 Children 64.9 68.1 43.0 43.2 
All 61.5 58.6 46.5 45.5 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
However, the opposite is true for those for couples without children 
without anyone in work, who face higher RRs and PTRs (weaker work 
incentives) in Ireland: for example, RRs for jobseekers whose partner 
doesn’t work are on average 5 percentage points higher in Ireland than 
the UK (59.2 per cent compared to 53.8 per cent). This in part reflects the 
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higher level of jobseeker payments available to childless families in 
Ireland (which are withdrawn entirely from those in full-time work), and 
the fact that the UK, but not Ireland, provides an earnings top-up for low-
income childless couples (through the Working Tax Credit).  
 
The differences between the two countries for potential second earners 
are less clear. While PTRs are significantly higher for unemployed 
jobseekers with a working partner in Ireland, they are slightly lower for 
those engaged in home duties. Likewise, while replacement rates are 
higher in the UK for potential second earners with children, they are 
lower for potential second earners without children who are classified as 
economically inactive. 
 
What of the financial incentive to move into part-time work? Table A5.1 
in the Appendix, when compared to Table 4, shows that while average 
RRs are higher at 20 than at 40 hours per week, PTRs are in general 
lower. Again, there are significant differences in the incentive to be in 
paid work faced by different family types across the two countries. 
Potential first earners in couples with children face significantly stronger 
incentives to be in part-time work in Ireland than the UK, in part 
reflecting the strong incentives created by the structure of welfare 
entitlements.20 The opposite is true for those in childless couples with a 
working partner, who face much lower RRs and somewhat lower PTRs in 
the UK. 
 
4.2 Employees 
We now turn briefly to the incentives to be in paid work faced by those 
currently employed. 
 
Figure 5 shows the median, 25th and 75th percentile of RRs and PTRs for 
those who are currently in work. While median RRs are slightly higher in 
the UK than in Ireland, median PTRs are much lower, at 35.7 per cent 
compared to 52.1 per cent. The capped bars also show that the 
distribution of PTRs is much more skewed to high values in Ireland: for 
 
                                                          
20  This includes potential to retain some Jobseeker Assistance support when only part-time work is available, 
and strong income support for those working 19 hours or more via the Family Income Supplement. As 
noted in Appendix 2, this comparative analysis is undertaken on the technical assumption of full take-up of 
all benefits, including FIS. 
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example, more than half of Irish employees face a PTR above 50 per cent 
compared to less than a quarter in the UK.  
 
As before, the opposite is true for replacement rates. The first two 
columns of Table 5 compare the proportion of employees facing RRs 
above 70 per cent in both countries. In Ireland, about a fifth of 
employees have a RR above this level, and so would see their family 
income fall by less than a third if they were to move out of work. In UK 
the figure is a little higher at 26 per cent, but as with Ireland, the 
overwhelming majority of employees are financially better off in work 
than out of work: only 1.1 per cent of workers face a replacement rate in 
excess of 100 per cent.  
 
The final two columns of Table 5 show that the occurrence of PTRs above 
70 per cent is also very infrequent in the two countries, at about 10 per 
cent. Most of these have a PTR of between 70-89 per cent with only 3.6 
per cent of those in Ireland and 1.9 per cent of those in the UK facing a 
PTR of 90 per cent or more.  
 
FIGURE 5  Distribution of Replacement and Participation Tax Rates for Employees, 
Ireland and the UK  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, calibrated to represent the 2015 
population, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and 
those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
Notes:  Columns show the median replacement rate or participation tax rate for each of the groups on the horizontal axis, 
while the capped bars show the 25th and 75th percentiles; the values for which 25 percent of the group have a 
replacement rate or participation tax rate below or above respectively.  
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TABLE 5  Replacement and Participation Tax Rates for Those Currently Employed 
RR/PTR Category Replacement Rates Participation Tax Rates 
 
Ireland UK Ireland UK 
>70 19.2 26.3 10.6 10.4 
>80 10.1 14.9 5.4 4.6 
>90 5.0 5.8 3.6 1.9 
>100 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations for employees aged 18-59, using and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey 
and. SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, both uprated and reweighted to represent 2015.   
 
What is driving these patterns? One factor that helps explain why more 
people face high RRs in the UK is that, as discussed in Section 4.1 above, a 
greater share of workers are employed at very low wage rates in the UK 
than in Ireland. As RRs tend to be higher at lower levels of earnings, more 
of the UK workforce face high replacement rates.  
 
Part of the explanation also arises from the differing composition of the 
working population in both countries. In Ireland, half of the population of 
employees aged 18 to 59 are single individuals, with a further 35 per cent 
in two-earner couples. In the UK, just 30 per cent of employees are 
single, with almost six out of ten employees in a two-earner couple.21 RRs 
tend to be lower for singles, as they in general have lower out-of-work 
family income than do couples, with and without children.  
 
Table A5.2 in the Appendix compares average replacement and 
participation tax rates of employees by family type. It shows that average 
replacement rates facing a given family type are broadly similar. Thus, 
rather than any particular family type facing higher RRs in the UK, the 
aggregate patterns are being driven by the fact that the family types that 
tend to face higher RRs are more likely to be employed in the UK than in 
Ireland. However, PTRs are lower in the UK on average for all but those 
with children and an out-of-work partner.22 Those in two-earner couples 
face much lower PTRs in the UK (30.9 per cent compared to 42.8 per cent 
in Ireland) as well as making up a much larger share of the workforce. The 
extent to which this relates to the much wider standard rate band in the 
 
                                                          
21  These estimates are derived from the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey for the UK, and the SWITCH 
database which calibrates the 2010 Survey on Income and Living Conditions to represent the 2015 situation.  
22  Employees with children and an out-of-work partner are likely to be entitled to a the maximum child tax 
credit award if they do not work, but by working, have it withdrawn and so face high a PTR. 
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UK, and to the greater degree of individualisation in the UK system, will 
be of interest for further investigation. 
 
5 THE INCENTIVE TO PROGRESS 
In this section we discuss how the incentive for those in work to increase 
their earnings differs between Ireland and the UK.  
 
As many individuals can be clustered at particular points in the tax 
schedule, tables showing banded METRs can be sensitive to small 
differences in tax rates. Instead, in Figure 6 we show the cumulative 
distribution of METRs; that is, the proportion of the working population 
(aged 18-59) facing an METR of less than that shown on the horizontal 
axis.23 In both countries less than a fifth of workers face a METR below 30 
per cent, with METRs highly concentrated in the range 35-60 per cent. 
This reflects the fact that the vast majority of those in work face either 
the basic or higher rates of income tax.  
 
For the UK, this results in three large mass points: 
• 24 per cent of employees face a METR of 37.14 per cent (the basic 
rate of income tax plus reduced rates of NICs)24 
• 27 per cent of employees face a METR of 40.25 per cent (the basic 
rate of income tax plus the standard rate of NICs), and  
• 9 per cent of employees face a METR of 49.03 per cent (the higher 
rate of income tax plus the reduced rate of NICs). 
 
For Ireland there are also three substantial mass points:  
• 30 per cent of employees face a METR of 37.7 per cent (those facing 
the basic rate of income tax, PRSI and USC). 
• 25 per cent of employees face a METR of 55.8 per cent (those facing 
the higher rate of income tax, PRSI, and the 7 per cent rate of USC). 
 
                                                          
23  We treat the small number of cases where the METR exceeds 100 per cent as if they were precisely 100 per 
cent. 
24  These reduced rates of NICs are currently paid by those who have contracted out of the state second 
pension and instead belong to a recognised defined benefit private pension scheme. The percentage levied 
on earnings between £112 and £770 per week in 2015-2016 is reduced by 1.4 percentage points for 
employee contributions and by 3.4 percentage points for employer contributions. Note that the option to 
‘contract out’ in this manner was removed in April 2016. 
24 
• 4 per cent of employees face a METR of 56.7 per cent (those facing 
the higher rate of income tax, PRSI, and the 8 per cent rate of USC). 
 
There are two notable differences between the distributions. First, a 
much larger share of workers in Ireland (41.7 per cent) face a METR 
greater than 50 per cent per cent than do workers in the UK (19.6 per 
cent). This is primarily because the higher rate of income tax applies to 
lower incomes in Ireland; €33,800 per year for single adults with no 
dependants compared to around €53,000 in the UK, for example. When 
combined with the USC and PRSI contributions, this results in a marginal 
effective tax rate of 55.8 or 56.7 per cent, compared to 49.03 per cent for 
higher-rate payers in the UK.  
 
FIGURE 6  Cumulative Distribution of Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METRs)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Working population aged 18-59, excluding disabled, those in education, and those aged 
less than 18 or over 59.  
 
Second, half as many workers in Ireland face METRs in excess of 70 per 
cent as is the case in the UK, where the withdrawal of means-tested 
benefits like income support, tax credits and housing benefit leave some 
low income households facing very weak incentives to increase their 
earnings (as shown by the very flat budget constraint at low hours of 
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work for single adults). By contrast, fewer households in Ireland receive 
support for housing costs or income top-ups as in the UK, and therefore 
do not face their withdrawal. This partly reflects inevitable trade-offs 
policymakers face in balancing objectives of redistribution against 
maintaining strong work incentives.  
 
The incidence of some very high METRs in the UK also highlights the 
dangers of layering multiple strands of support on top of each other in an 
un-coordinated way, which in the UK has resulted in arbitrary overlaps 
between means tests that drive most of the weakest work incentives. 
Concerns about the effects these high METRs could have on the work 
decisions of low-income households were in part responsible for the 
previous UK government’s decision to replace the main means-tested 
benefits and tax credits for those of working age with a single means-
tested payment, known as Universal Credit. This reform is planned to 
come into effect over the lifetime of the current UK parliament, and is 
described in further detail in Appendix 4. 
 
As well as these aggregate differences across working populations, there 
is variation in the distribution of METRs across family types both in and 
across the two countries. Figures A5.1-A5.5 plot the cumulative 
distribution of METRs for different family types. For singles and those 
with working partners (Figures A5.1, A5.2, A5.5), the patterns are broadly 
similar to those already described at aggregate level: Ireland has more 
individuals facing METRs of more than 50 per cent, but fewer facing 
METRs of more than 60 per cent. 
 
The pattern is very different, however, for one-earner couples – both 
with, and without children (Figures A5.3 and A5.4). More than half of 
those in one-earner couples with children face an METR in excess of 70 
per cent in the UK, compared to less than a quarter in Ireland. Similarly, 
while very few of those in one-earner couples without children face an 
METR above 60 per cent in Ireland, more than a fifth do in the UK. This is 
primarily a result of the UK’s more extensive system of in-work benefits, 
most notably working and child tax credits for low-income households, 
which are withdrawn at a rate of 41 per cent on top of income tax and 
NICs. Ireland provides less-extensive support to low-income working 
families (particularly without children), meaning fewer face their 
withdrawal and the associated high METRs. 
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Figure 7 shows how average METRs vary by earnings, measured in terms 
of the cost to an employer.25 It shows that in the UK, METRs are high at 
low levels of earnings as means-tested support is withdrawn, then fall at 
moderate-to-high levels of earnings where people face only basic-rate 
income tax and NICs, and then rise again as higher rates of income tax 
take effect alongside the withdrawal of child benefit from high income 
households. 
 
In Ireland, although the withdrawal of means-tested benefits create some 
high METRs at lower levels of earnings, it is those further up the earnings 
distribution (facing the higher-rate of income tax, PRSI, and the 7 or 8 per 
cent rates of USC) who have the highest METRs on average. The second 
‘hump’, where METRs begin to rise at moderate-to-high levels of 
earnings, also happens earlier in Ireland: as already noted, this is 
primarily because the higher rate of income tax applies to lower incomes 
in Ireland. 
 
FIGURE 7  Average METRs by Employer Cost 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Working population aged 18-59, excluding disabled, those in education, and those aged 
less than 18 or over 59. 
Notes:  Series show estimates of a ’locally-weighted regression’ of METRs on employer cost, defined as gross earnings plus 
employer social security contributions. 
 
 
                                                          
25  We plot mean METRs against employer cost rather than earnings in order to include employer social 
security contributions. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Comparisons of tax and welfare systems that rely simply on illustrative 
cases or headline tax rates can be highly misleading. A comprehensive 
picture of the financial work incentives implied by the tax/transfer 
system requires a tax-benefit model, based on nationally representative 
survey data. This is true at a national level, and equally so for cross 
country comparisons.26 In this paper we conduct a harmonised analysis 
using the IFS TAXBEN model and the ESRI SWITCH model to compare the 
incentives faced by key groups of the Irish and UK populations. 
 
We looked first at the incentive to be in employment, as measured by 
replacement rates and participation tax rates (measures described in 
Section 3). The replacement rate can be seen as a measure of the 
absolute strength of the financial incentive to take up employment. As a 
result, it will include not only the impact of taxes and benefits, but also of 
wages; and one feature not commonly remarked upon is that Irish wages 
– converted at a purchasing power adjusted exchange rate of €1=£0.8245 
– are significantly higher than in the UK. This tends to strengthen the 
incentive to work as measured by the replacement rate. The participation 
tax rate, on the other hand, allows a sharper focus on the incentives 
created by the tax/transfer system. 
 
We found that on average, RRs look quite similar in the two countries, 
although there is greater dispersion in the UK, with a larger share of both 
the employed and out-of-work population facing replacement rates 
above 70 per cent. By contrast, PTRs are on average higher in Ireland, 
particularly for those currently in work and unemployed jobseekers. 
Importantly, the incidence of the highest participation tax rates (those 
greater than 70 per cent, which can be the most distortive to labour 
market decisions) is somewhat higher in the UK. Very few individuals 
would be financially better off out of work, though a significant minority 
do face high replacement and participation tax rates in both countries.   
 
We also highlight some interesting differences by family type. On 
average, potential first earners in couples with children face weaker 
incentives to be in full-time work in the UK than in Ireland, while the 
opposite is true for potential first earners in couples without children. 
This is in part due to differences in the design of each country’s benefit 
 
                                                          
26  Indeed, this forms part of the genesis of the EUROMOD project (Sutherland and Figari, 2013).  
28 
system: the UK provides more generous out-of-work benefits to couples 
with children than does Ireland, while the opposite is true for out-of-
work couples without children.  
 
The paper also examined the incentive to progress (i.e. earn more 
whether through increased hours, effort or skill), as measured by the 
marginal effective tax rate (METR – this includes benefit withdrawal as 
well as explicit taxes on income and social insurance contributions). Key 
findings here included the facts that: 
• a much larger share of workers in Ireland (more than 40 per cent) 
face a marginal effective tax rate greater than 50 per cent than do 
workers in the UK (just under 20 per cent). This is because the 
threshold at which the higher rate of income tax begins to apply is 
much lower in Ireland than in the UK; 
• fewer workers in Ireland faced marginal effective tax rates in 
excess of 70 per cent than in the UK, due to the UK’s more 
extensive system of in-work benefits and in particular the greater 
prevalence of people facing the withdrawal of multiple benefits. 
 
As indicated in our introduction, this paper provides a more detailed 
picture of financial incentives to work for Ireland and the UK, with 
considerable attention devoted to ensuring comparability of the 
analyses. Measurement of work incentives is, however, only part of the 
overall story. Identifying the responsiveness of labour market behaviour 
to such incentives is clearly an important further input to policymakers 
and policy debate, as this has a key influence on how objectives of 
economic efficiency and distributional concern can best be reconciled. 
Estimation of such labour supply responses has been an ongoing feature 
of UK and international research; a renewed focus on this topic would 
now be opportune in Ireland. 
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Appendix 1 – Wage Predictions 
In previous work, IFS and ESRI teams have followed broadly similar 
approaches. Wages for those not currently employed are predicted using 
a wage equation estimated for those who have a wage, and a prediction 
for non-participants or those who are unemployed based on their 
characteristics. The precise set of characteristics used for these 
predictions depends on the variables available in the relevant dataset, 
and can also be affected by the number of cases in the sample with 
certain characteristics. In this paper the wage equations used for Ireland 
and the UK are as reported below. The approach was harmonised in the 
sense that it sought to predict hourly wages, so that incentives could be 
measured at both full-time and part-time hours (with 40 and 20 hours 
being taken as typical values).27 Age and education play a key role in both 
specifications, but there are differences with respect to other variables. A 
sensitivity analysis was undertaken, with estimation of a wage equation 
for Ireland following the IFS approach for the UK as closely as possible, 
given the constraints on data. This approach led to very similar results to 
those reported in the main body of the paper.  
  
 
                                                          
27  The approaches were also harmonised in using estimated wages for the unemployed without any 
adjustment for ‘wage scarring’ – a negative impact on wages from a spell of unemployment. Savage et al. 
(2014) found that a wage scarring adjustment of 10 per cent could add about 2 percentage points to the 
proportion of the unemployed facing high replacement rates. 
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TABLE A1.1 Wage Equation Results, Ireland 
Ireland: Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Wage 
Base categories Single man, no education beyond primary 
Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Intercept 1.20 0.19 6.44 
MarriedMan -0.62 0.36 -1.74 
MarriedWoman -0.34 0.35 -0.97 
SingleWoman 0.04 0.25 0.15 
SingleMan_EducJuniorCert 0.11 0.10 1.17 
SingleMan_EducLeavingCert 0.14 0.09 1.59 
SingleMan_EducAdvancedCert 0.27 0.11 2.34 
SingleMan_EducUniversityDegree 0.47 0.09 5.34 
SingleMan_EducUnknown 0.07 0.15 0.45 
MarriedMan_EducJuniorCert 0.14 0.06 2.3 
MarriedMan_EducLeavingCert 0.38 0.06 6.48 
MarriedMan_EducAdvancedCert 0.19 0.08 2.41 
MarriedMan_EducUniversityDegree 0.72 0.06 12.96 
MarriedMan_EducUnknown 0.17 0.11 1.6 
MarriedWoman_EducJuniorCert -0.01 0.08 -0.08 
MarriedWoman_EducLeavingCert 0.22 0.07 3.31 
MarriedWoman_EducAdvancedCert 0.24 0.13 1.82 
MarriedWoman_EducUniversityDegree 0.70 0.07 10.48 
MarriedWoman_EducUnknown 0.03 0.14 0.24 
SingleWoman_EducJuniorCert 0.08 0.09 0.84 
SingleWoman_EducLeavingCert 0.18 0.08 2.18 
SingleWoman_EducAdvancedCert 0.16 0.14 1.15 
SingleWoman_EducUniversityDegree 0.56 0.08 6.88 
SingleWoman_EducUnknown 0.03 0.14 0.25 
SingleMan_Age 0.06 0.01 6.59 
SingleMan_AgeSquared -0.57 0.11 -5.35 
MarriedMan_Age 0.08 0.01 6.14 
MarriedMan_AgeSquared -0.77 0.14 -5.46 
MarriedWoman_Age 0.07 0.01 5.26 
MarriedWoman_AgeSquared -0.68 0.14 -4.74 
SingleWoman_Age 0.05 0.01 6.21 
SingleWoman_AgeSquared -0.46 0.10 -4.6 
    
N of observations 2,849   
Adjusted R2 0.3218   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions. 
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TABLE A1.2 Wage Equation Results, UK 
UK: Log Hourly Wage Regression 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Women -0.356 (.2714) 
Age ceased education 0.0467*** (.001975) 
 Interacted with sex -0.00822** (.002753) 
Age 0.124*** (.01418) 
 Interacted with sex 0.0425* (.02091) 
Age squared -0.00214*** (.000329) 
 Interacted with sex -0.00111* (.0004864) 
Age cubed 0.0000113*** (2.42e-06) 
 Interacted with sex 0.00000832* (3.59e-06) 
Non-white -0.194*** (.02406) 
 Interacted with sex 0.0845* (.03385) 
Homeowner 0.266*** (.01603) 
 Interacted with sex -0.0219 (.02245) 
Age youngest child 0-2 -0.209*** (.02559) 
Age youngest child 3-5 -0.0663* (.02871) 
Age youngest child 6-8 -0.0767* (.02998) 
Age youngest child 9-11 -0.132*** (.03125) 
Age youngest child 12-14 -0.103*** (.03031) 
Age youngest child 15+ -0.0452 (.02961) 
Age youngest child 0-2*women 0.213*** (.03533) 
Age youngest child 3-5*women 0.127** (.04022) 
Age youngest child 6-8*women 0.125** (.04313) 
Age youngest child 9-11*women 0.180*** (.0461) 
Age youngest child 12-14*women 0.0955* (.04537) 
Age youngest child 15+*women 0.0488 (.0444) 
Married 0.118*** (.02081) 
 Interacted with sex -0.114*** (.02837) 
Cohabiting 0.0640** (.02284) 
 Interacted with sex -0.0523 (.03195) 
Lone parent -0.0192 (.07083) 
 Interacted with sex -0.0247 (.07703) 
Constant -0.661*** (.1861) 
N of observations 16972  
Adjusted R2 0.204  
Region dummies  YES 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2013-2014 Family Resources Survey. 
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Appendix 2 – Harmonisation of Samples and Methods  
This appendix provides information on the population groups whose 
financial incentive to work is examined, and how methods and 
assumptions in the Irish and UK analyses were harmonised.  
 
Population 
The analysis examines the financial incentive to work for individuals in 
three different labour force status groups: employees, unemployed 
jobseekers, and economically inactive individuals. We restrict the analysis 
to individuals aged between 18 and 59. This restriction excludes older 
workers where issues like the relationship between stopping work and 
starting to claim private and state pensions, deferral possibilities, option 
values, etc. are conceptually complex, demanding of data, and can vary 
radically between Ireland and the UK. We also exclude individuals in full-
time education, and individuals who report having a disability that 
prohibits them from work from the analysis for similar reasons. The 
financial work incentives of self-employed individuals are also not 
examined in the paper. 
 
In the UK, 84 per cent of individuals under analysis are employees, 
compared to 77 per cent in Ireland, as shown in Table A2.1. Conversely, 
16 per cent of individuals in the UK are out-of-work, compared to 23 per 
cent in Ireland. This 7 percentage point gap is due in about equal 
measure to lower labour market participation in Ireland28 and to a higher 
unemployment rate in Ireland).29 
 
Table A2.1 also shows that the composition of the out-of-work individuals 
in the two countries is quite similar, with individuals who are 
unemployed and seeking employment making up approximately one-in-
three of the group. The remaining two-thirds of the out-of-work 
individuals report are defined as economically inactive. In SILC, these 
individuals report themselves as being ‘engaged in home duties’.  
 
 
                                                          
28  2014 is the latest available information on labour force participation rates in the OECD database. See OECD 
(2016), Labour force participation rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8a801325-en [Accessed on 30/5/2016]. 
29  https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm [accessed 30/5/2016]. 
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TABLE A2.1  Numbers and Proportions of Employees and Out-of-Work Individuals 
 Ireland UK  N (000s) % N (000s) % 
Employees 1,481 77 25,800 84 
Out-of-Work, of whom: 454 23 5,014 16 
 (unemployed jobseekers) (156) (8) (1,487) (5) 
 (other out-of-work) (298) (15) (3,527) (11) 
Total   1,935  100  30,815  100 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
The family type composition of the different labour force groups are 
shown in Table A2.2 and Table A2.3. Table A2.2 shows a significantly 
higher proportion of employees are single in Ireland (50 per cent) than in 
the UK (29 per cent). Almost 60 per cent of employees have a working 
partner in the UK, compared to 35 per cent in Ireland. This difference is 
largely made up of a higher proportion of dual-earner couples with no 
children in the UK (30 per cent) compared to Ireland (12 per cent).  
 
TABLE A2.2  Family Type Distribution in Ireland and the UK – Employees aged 18-59 
  Ireland UK 
  N (000s) % N (000s) % 
 Single  738 50 7,563 29 
 Couple, partner not working  223 15 2,967 12 
 No children  73 5 1,175 5 
 Children  150 10 1,792 7 
 Couple, partner working  520 35 15,200 59 
 No children  185 12 7,800 30 
 Children  335 23 7,400 29 
 All  1,481 100 25,800 100 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
More than half of unemployed jobseekers in both countries are single. A 
higher proportion of unemployed jobseekers have a non-working partner 
and children in Ireland than the UK. The majority of economically inactive 
individuals have a working partner in both counties, though a higher 
proportion of this group are single in the UK than in Ireland.  
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TABLE A2.3  Unemployed Jobseekers and Home Duties Family Type Distribution 
  Unemployed Jobseekers 
Economically Inactive/’Engaged 
in Home Duties’ 
  Ireland  UK Ireland UK 
Single 51 61 18 29 
Couple, partner not working 29 17 16 20 
No children 7 5 6 10 
Children 22 13 9 10 
Couple, partner working 21 22 67 52 
No children 6 10 19 14 
Children 15 12 48 37 
Total number of Individuals 156 1,487 298 3,527 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
Methodological Assumptions 
Where there are time-limited or otherwise duration-dependent benefits, 
we use long-run incentive measures. For example, contribution-based 
jobseeker’s payments30 are available for only six months in the UK and 
nine months in Ireland. Further examples of time-limited benefits include 
support for mortgage interest in the UK, and the Back-to-Work Family 
Dividend in Ireland. In each case, incomes are calculated on a long-term 
basis – i.e. when entitlement to time-limited benefits has expired. One 
exception to this is for unemployed jobseekers who report entitlement to 
Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) in Ireland. These individuals are modelled to 
receive JB in the main analysis. If instead, JA rates were used, then some 
individuals would receive the same amount as a means-tested payment, 
while others would see the payment reduced by means testing (e.g., 
because of the earnings of a spouse). In the latter case the replacement 
rate or PTR estimated using JA would then be lower than that used here. 
  
Although differences between indirect tax systems in the two countries 
may affect financial incentives to work, indirect taxes are not included in 
the analysis. Detailed micro-level expenditure is required to model the 
impact of indirect taxes; such data are not available in SILC. Initial 
research on imputing expenditure into SILC from an expenditure survey 
 
                                                          
30  Jobseeker’s Allowance in the UK, Jobseeker’s Benefit in Ireland. 
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(the Household Budget Survey) has suggested that this approach may 
provide reasonable estimates of the distribution of expenditure (see 
Savage and Callan, 2015). This remains a task for future work, however.  
 
Non-take-up of entitlements is significant for some transfers. For 
example, HMRC estimate that take-up of the Working Tax Credit by those 
without children was only 30 per cent of those eligible in 2010-2011 
(HMRC, 2012). Similarly, Callan et al. (2015) suggested non-take-up of 
medical cards and GP visit cards may be an issue in Ireland. Due to 
difficulties in modelling take-up of benefits (see Adam and Browne, 2013, 
for discussion), we assume full take-up of all benefit entitlements in this 
analysis. An advantage of this assumption is that it allows full 
examination of the impact of tax and benefit design in both countries, 
abstracting from issues around take-up and salience.  
 
Non-cash benefits and non-cash remuneration are particularly difficult to 
include in a work incentive analysis such as this. Two main difficulties 
exist. First, information on receipt or value of non-cash remuneration 
may not exist in the data (for example, receipt or availability of workplace 
nurseries and canteens, work-related accommodation, phones and bikes 
for employee use, etc.). Second, it can be conceptually difficult to 
estimate an equivalent cash value for the receipt of non-cash benefits or 
remuneration. Results in the analysis are based largely on cash (or near 
cash) incomes and benefits. One exception is the inclusion of estimates of 
the value of a medical card in the results for Ireland, as there is a contrast 
between the universal nature of the benefit provided by the UK NHS and 
the means-tested entitlement under the Irish medical card, which can 
alter the balance between net resources (inclusive of health benefits) in 
and out-of-work. A detailed description of how the medical card is valued 
can be found in Savage et al. (2015). 
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Appendix 3 – Main Working-Age Means Tested 
Benefits in the UK31 
Income support (IS).  
Introduced in 1988 as the main income-related out-of-work benefit for 
those deemed unable to work (those with disabilities, pensioners, lone 
parents and carers), its scope has diminished over time. The minimum 
income guarantee and subsequently pension credit replaced IS for 
pensioners from 1999, income-based employment and support 
allowance replaced IS on the grounds of disability in 2008, and lone 
parents whose youngest child is aged five or over now have to claim 
jobseeker’s allowance instead. Over the course of 2015-2016, there are 
expected to be an average of 715,000 claimants in Great Britain and total 
expenditure is expected to be £2.6 billion.  
 
Income-based jobseeker’s allowance (JSA).  
This is the income-related out-of-work benefit for those who are not in 
paid work and are required to take steps to look for work. Introduced in 
its current form in 1996, it is expected that the number of claimants will 
average 598,000 across 2015-2016 in Great Britain and the total cost will 
be £2.0 billion.  
 
Income-based employment and support allowance (ESA).  
This is the income-related out-of-work benefit for those assessed as 
having limited capability for work on health grounds. Introduced in 2008, 
it is expected that there will be an average of 1.7 million claimants across 
2015-2016 in Great Britain, and total expenditure is expected to be 
£9.8 billion.  
 
Child tax credit (CTC).  
This provides support to low-income families with children, both in and 
out of work. It was introduced in 2003 to replace child additions to other 
benefits (including those mentioned above). In December 2015, there 
were 3.8 million families claiming child tax credit, of whom 1.2 million 
 
                                                          
31  Figures for number of claimants and total expenditure are taken from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hmrc-annual-report-and-accounts-2014-to-2015 and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/485170/cwtc-main-
Dec15.pdf. 
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contained no adult in paid work and 2.6 million contained at least one 
working adult, and total expenditure in 2014-2015 was £22.8 billion.  
 
Working tax credit (WTC).  
This provides support to low-income working families, both with and 
without children. As well as supporting low-income working families, 
WTC also strengthens work incentives for those with low incomes who 
would otherwise see little difference between their earnings in work and 
the benefits they would be entitled to if they did not work. Similar 
programmes exist in other developed countries – for example, the 
earned income tax credit in the US and Family Income Supplement in 
Ireland. Programmes for providing support to low-income working 
families with children have existed in the UK since 1971, but they have 
expanded over time to the extent that they are almost unrecognisable 
from their original incarnations. They were extended to families without 
children when working tax credit was introduced in 2003. There were 
2.3 million families claiming WTC in December 2015 and total 
expenditure in 2014-2015 was £6.2 billion.  
 
Housing benefit.  
This provides low-income households in rented accommodation with 
support for their rental costs. A national system of housing benefit has 
existed since the early 1970s, with the current system introduced in 
1988. Over the course of 2015-2016, there are expected to be an average 
of 4.8 million claimants of housing benefit in Great Britain and total 
expenditure is expected to be £24.4 billion.  
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Appendix 4 – Universal Credit in the UK32 
The UK government is currently rolling out the most radical reform to the 
working-age benefits system for decades. A single means-tested 
payment, known as universal credit (UC), is being introduced as a 
replacement for six existing means-tested benefits and tax credits for 
those of working age: income support, income-based jobseeker’s 
allowance, income-based employment and support allowance, child tax 
credit, working tax credit and housing benefit. 
 
The ‘legacy’ system that UC will replace is largely the product of a history 
of separate decisions to layer new strands of support on top of what 
came before: for example, the decisions in the 1970s to create a national 
system of housing benefit and a new form of support for low-income 
working families. Previous social security reforms, including the Fowler 
reforms of the late 1980s and the introduction of the current tax credit 
system in 2003, stopped far short of the ambitious integration of benefits 
that UC will bring about. The central point of UC, and the reason for 
many of its potential advantages, is that it replaces the resulting jumble 
of separate and overlapping means tests with one integrated assessment 
of families’ entitlements. UC should look more like a system that has 
been designed from scratch as a coherent whole – as indeed it is. 
 
To demonstrate the effect of UC on benefit entitlements at different 
levels of family income, Figure A4.1 shows the benefit and tax credit 
entitlements (in current prices) of a lone parent with two children renting 
in an average-rent area and paid the National Living Wage under the 
system we currently expect to be in place in 2019-2020. We show this 
first under the legacy benefits and tax credits system (the blocks) and 
second under UC (the grey line). We can see that the main features of UC 
are as follows: 
• Its basic structure involves a ‘maximum’ level of entitlement, which is 
received by those with the lowest levels of private incomes and 
financial assets. Entitlement is reduced below this maximum when 
income exceeds a certain threshold, known as the work allowance.  
• The maximum entitlement is set in a similar manner to the maximum 
entitlements to the different benefits and tax credits under the 
legacy system.  
 
                                                          
32  This section draws heavily on Browne et al. (2016). 
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• This example individual can earn more before benefits start to be 
withdrawn than they can under the legacy system. Furthermore, 
when benefits start to be withdrawn, they are withdrawn at a slower 
rate. Both of these features strengthen the incentive for this 
individual to work a small number of hours each week.  
• Unlike in the legacy system, there is no jump in entitlement at 16 
hours of work, the point at which the lone parent becomes entitled 
to WTC under the legacy system. This means that UC is less generous 
than the legacy system if this lone parent works more than 16 hours, 
but more generous than the legacy system if they work less than 16 
hours.  
• When this example individual is working at least 16 hours per week, 
UC is withdrawn more slowly as income rises than the combination of 
tax credits and housing benefit under the legacy system, 
strengthening the incentive for this lone parent to increase their 
earnings (whether through additional hours or higher hourly pay).  
• The overall effect for this individual is that there is marginally less 
support when working part-time (between 16 and 40 hours per 
week) than under the legacy system, but more support at higher 
levels of earnings and for those working only a few hours per week 
(‘mini jobs’).  
 
FIGURE A4.1  Benefit Entitlements by Hours Worked for Lone Parent with Two Children 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN. 
Note:  Assumes two children aged under 5, no childcare costs, no unearned income, renting at the LHA rate in a median 
rent area and paid the National Living Wage under the system we currently expect to be in place in 2019-2020. 
Ignores child benefit and council tax support.  
£0
£50
£100
£150
£200
£250
£300
£350
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
W
ee
kl
y 
be
ne
fit
 a
m
ou
nt
 
Hours worked at National Living Wage 
Working tax credit
Child tax credit
Housing benefit
Jobseeker's allowance
Universal credit
42 
Appendix 5 – Additional Tables and Figures 
TABLE A5.1  Average Predicted Replacement and Participation Tax Rates at 20 hours, by 
Family Type 
  Replacement Rates Participation Tax Rates 
  Ireland UK Ireland UK 
Unemployed Jobseekers 
Single 52.9 53.0 54.3 50.1 
Couple, partner not working 74.7 83.9 55.9 73.1 
 No children 70.6 77.9 63.5 71.8 
 Children 76.0 86.1 53.6 73.6 
Couple, partner working 72.2 73.5 52.1 34.5 
 No children 66.9 66.6 44.6 21.7 
 Children 74.5 79.1 55.3 44.7 
All 63.1 62.8 54.3 50.6 
Economically Inactive / ‘Home Duties’ 
Single 58.6 55.8 32.6 40.6 
Couple, partner not working 69.2 78.5 24.7 60.2 
 No children 72.9 72.8 55.2 48.5 
 Children 66.7 84.2 3.2 72.1 
Couple, partner working 76.1 76.4 35.2 31.9 
 No children 76.4 68.9 37.3 22.1 
 Children 75.9 79.3 34.4 35.6 
All 71.9 70.9 33.1 39.9 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
 
TABLE A5.2  Average Replacement and Participation Tax Rates for Employees, by Family 
Type 
  Replacement Rates Participation Tax Rates 
  Ireland UK Ireland UK 
Employees 
Single 40.8 39.8 50.7 45.4 
Couple, partner not working 62.3 62.0 61.5 60.4 
 No children 57.8 51.8 58.5 49.0 
 Children 64.4 68.6 63.0 67.9 
Couple, partner working 62.8 58.9 42.8 30.9 
 No children 57.9 54.0 36.3 26.4 
 Children 65.5 64.1 46.4 35.8 
All 51.8 53.6 49.6 38.6 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions, and TAXBEN run on the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey. Excludes disabled, those in education, and those aged less than 18 or over 59. 
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FIGURE A5.1  Cumulative Distribution of METRs: Partner Working, No Children 
  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
FIGURE A5.2  Cumulative Distribution of METRs: Partner Working, With Children 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education. 
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FIGURE A5.3  Cumulative Distribution of METRs: Partner Not Working, No Children 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
FIGURE A5.4  Cumulative Distribution of METRs: Partner Not Working, With Children 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
(A
ge
d 
18
-5
9)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Marginal Effective Tax Rate (%)
IRE UK
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
(A
ge
d 
18
-5
9)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Marginal Effective Tax Rate (%)
IRE UK
45 
FIGURE A5.5  Cumulative Distribution of METRs: Single Adults and Lone Parents  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the population aged 18-59 in the 2010 Survey of Living Conditions and the 2013-2014 
Family Resources Survey, uprated to April 2015 terms. Excludes disabled and those in full-time education.  
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